EASYCRYPT's Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic and Probabilistic Noninterference

These slides are an example-based introduction to EASYCRYPT'S Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic (pRHL), focusing on how it can be used to prove probabilistic noninterference results.

When we have been using EASYCRYPT's Relational Hoare Logic, we've already been using pRHL—but just not the probabilistic aspects of the while language or logic.

Datatype, Axioms and Lemmas for Our Examples

The examples (prob-noninter.ec) that follow use the following datatype, a type mybool with elements tt ("true") and ff ("false"):

```
type mybool = [tt | ff].
```

Sometimes we need to use these lemmas when smt gets confused:

```
lemma not_tt (x : mybool) :
    x <> tt <=> x = ff.
proof. smt(). qed.
lemma not_ff (x : mybool) :
    x <> ff <=> x = tt.
proof. smt(). qed.
```

Datatype, Axioms and Lemmas for Our Examples

We introduce and axiomatize the exclusive or operator as follows:

op (^^) : mybool -> mybool -> mybool.

axiom xor_tt_tt : tt ^^ tt = ff. axiom xor_tt_ff : tt ^^ ff = tt. axiom xor_ff_tt : ff ^^ tt = tt. axiom xor_ff_ff : ff ^^ ff = ff.

Because tt is an alias for the value () of type unit, you'll sometimes see Top.tt in goals, meaning the version of tt that we have introduced.

Datatype, Axioms and Lemmas for Our Examples

We can use these axioms to prove:

```
(* false on the right *)
lemma xor_ff (x : mybool) : x ^^ ff = x.
(* canceling *)
lemma xorK (x : mybool) : x ^^ x = ff.
(* commutativity *)
lemma xorC (x y : mybool) : x ^^ y = y ^^ x.
(* associativity *)
lemma xorA (x y z : mybool) : (x ^^ y) ^^ z = x ^^ (y ^^ z).
```

(Sub-)Distributions

To make use of (sub-)distributions in EASYCRYPT, we

require import Distr.

This gives us types 'a distr, consisting of sub-distributions over the type 'a. This means that the sum of the values of the elements of 'a in the sub-distribution may be strictly less than the real number 1 (which is written 1%r).

We can then declare dmybool to be a sub-distribution on our datatype mybool by:

op dmybool : mybool distr.

To say that dmybool is a distribution, we introduce the axiom:

axiom dmybool_ll : is_lossless dmybool.

This says that the sum of the values of tt and ff in dmybool is 1%r.

(Sub-)Distributions

If *d* is a sub-distribution on type 'a, and *E* is an event (i.e., a predicate) on 'a (i.e., *E* is a function from 'a to bool), then mu *d E* is the probability that choosing a value from *d* will satisfy *E* (the sum of the values in *d* of the elements of 'a satisfying *E*). If *d* is a sub-distribution on type 'a, and *x* is a value of type 'a, then mu1 *d x* is the probability that choosing a value from *d* will result in *x*.

mu1 is defined by

```
mu1 d x = mu d (pred1 x)
```

where $pred1 \times is$ the predicate that is only satisfied by x.

(Sub-)Distributions

Thus we can axiomatize that tt and ff both have probability one half in dmybool via:

```
axiom dmybool1E (b : mybool) :
  mu1 dmybool b = 1%r / 2%r.
```

We can then prove that dmybool is *full*, i.e., that its *support* (the values of the type given non-zero probabilities by the distribution) is all of dmybool:

```
lemma dmybool_fu : is_full dmybool.
proof.
rewrite /is_full => x.
by rewrite /support dmybool1E StdOrder.RealOrder.divr_gtO.
qed.
```

(It takes a little digging through the Distr theory to understand this proof.)

Random Assignment

If x is a program variable of type 'a, and d is sub-distribution on 'a, i.e., a value of type 'a distr, then

x <\$ d;

means to assign to x a value from 'a, where the probability that a given value v in 'a is chosen is equal to v's value in d. If d is not not a distribution, there is some probability the random assignment will cause the program to abort.

For our first probabilistic noninterference example, consider the program

```
module M1 = {
  var x : mybool (* private *)
  var y : mybool (* public *)
  proc f() : unit = {
    var b : mybool;
    b <$ dmybool;
    y <- x ^^ b;
  }
}.</pre>
```

The procedure M1.f exclusive or's the private variable M1.x of type mybool with a randomly chosen value b, updating the public variable M1.y with the result.

We state and begin our noninterference proof as usual:

```
lemma lem1 :
    equiv[M1.f ~ M1.f : ={M1.y} ==> ={M1.y}].
proof.
proc.
wp.
```

taking us to the goal

Type variables: <none>

```
&1 (left ) : {b : mybool} [programs are in sync]
&2 (right) : {b : mybool}
pre = ={M1.y}
(1) b <$ dmybool
post = M1.x{1} ^ b{1} = M1.x{2} ^ b{2}
```

Because *both* programs *end* with random assignments (the same in this case), we can apply the

rnd.

tactic, which pushes the two random assignments into the postcondition, giving us the goal

Type variables: <none>

```
&1 (left ) : {b : mybool} [programs are in sync]
&2 (right) : {b : mybool}
pre = ={M1.y}
post =
  (forall (bR : mybool),
     bR \in dmybool => bR = bR) &&
  (forall (bR : mybool),
     bR \in dmybool =>
     mu1 dmybool bR = mu1 dmybool bR) &&
  forall (bL : mybool),
    bL \in dmybool =>
    (bL \in dmybool) &&
    bL = bL \&\& M1.x\{1\} ^{bL} = M1.x\{2\} ^{bL}
```

Unfortunately, a crucial part of the postcondition requires us to prove

 $M1.x{1} \cap bL = M1.x{2} \cap bL$

for a universally quantified bL, which is impossible, given that we don't know the relationship between M1.x in the two memories.

Thankfully, though, the rnd tactic takes, as an optional argument, an isomorphism h between the distributions of the two random assignments. (See below for exactly what being such an isomorphism means; by default, rnd uses the identity function when the types are the same.) In the above part of the postcondition, the right occurrence of bL will be replaced by h bL, and we should choose h so as to make the resulting equality provable (and still, hopefully, be an isomorphism).

Consequently, we should run

```
rnd (fun z => M1.x{1} ^{M1.x{2}} ^{2} z).
```

("fun $z \Rightarrow ...$ " is an anonymous function that takes in an argument z and returns ...) which gives us a postcondition where the previously problematic part is

 $M1.x{1} \cap bL = M1.x{2} \cap (M1.x{1} \cap M1.x{2} \cap bL)$

This is provable using

smt(xorA xorC xorK xor_ff).

To understand the rest of the postcondition generated by our use of rnd, we can follow it with

```
skip; progress.
```

which gives us five subgoals. The first subgoal is

```
Type variables: <none>
```

which makes us prove that, for all bR ("R" for chosen from the right-hand distribution) in the support of dmybool (all of mybool), running our argument to rnd twice gets us back to where we started. This can be proved by

```
smt(xorA xorC xorK xor_ff).
```

The second subgoal is

This gives us the conclusion of the first subgoal (H), and makes us prove that for all bR in the support of dmybool, the value of bR in dmybool is the same as the value of the result of applying our argument to rnd to bR. This can be solved with

smt(dmybool1E).

The third subgoal is

```
Type variables: <none>
&1: {b : mybool}
&2: {b : mybool}
H: forall (bR : mybool),
     bR \in dmybool =>
     bR = M1.x\{1\} \cap M1.x\{2\} \cap (M1.x\{1\} \cap M1.x\{2\} \cap bR)
HO: forall (bR : mybool),
      bR \in dmybool =>
      mu1 dmybool bR =
      mu1 dmybool (M1.x{1} ^^ M1.x{2} ^^ bR)
bL: mybool
H1: bL \in dmybool
M1.x{1} ^{M1.x{2}} ^{bL} \lim dmybool
```

This makes us prove that for all bL in the support of the left distribution, the result of applying our argument to rnd to bL is in the support of the right distribution (both distributions are the same in our case). This can be solved with

smt(dmybool_fu).

The fourth subgoal is

```
Type variables: <none>
&1: {b : mybool}
&2: {b : mybool}
H: forall (bR : mybool),
     bR \in dmybool =>
     bR = M1.x\{1\} \cap M1.x\{2\} \cap (M1.x\{1\} \cap M1.x\{2\} \cap bR)
HO: forall (bR : mybool),
      bR \in dmybool =>
      mu1 dmybool bR =
      mu1 dmybool (M1.x{1} ^^ M1.x{2} ^^ bR)
bL: mybool
H1: bL \in dmybool
H2: M1.x{1} ^^ M1.x{2} ^^ bL \in dmybool
bL = M1.x\{1\} ^{M1.x}\{2\} ^{M1.x}\{1\} ^{M1.x}\{2\} ^{L1}bL
```

This is the same as H, except starting from the left distribution instead of the right one. Consequently, we can solve this goal in our case by

by apply H.

Finally, the fifth subgoal is

```
Type variables: <none>
```

```
&1: {b : mybool}
&2: {b : mybool}
H: forall (bR : mybool),
     bR \in dmybool =>
     bR = M1.x\{1\} \land M1.x\{2\} \land (M1.x\{1\} \land M1.x\{2\} \land bR)
HO: forall (bR : mybool),
      bR \in dmybool =>
      mu1 dmybool bR =
      mu1 dmybool (M1.x{1} ^^ M1.x{2} ^^ bR)
bL: mybool
H1: bL \in dmybool
H2: M1.x{1} ^^ M1.x{2} ^^ bL \in dmybool
H3: bL = M1.x\{1\} \land M1.x\{2\} \land (M1.x\{1\} \land M1.x\{2\} \land bL)
M1.x{1} \cap bL = M1.x{2} \cap (M1.x{1} \cap M1.x{2} \cap bL)
```

As we noted before, this can be solved by smt(xorA xorC xorK xor_ff).

Putting it all together, the complete probabilistic noninterference proof for our first example is:

```
lemma lem1 :
    equiv[M1.f ~ M1.f : ={M1.y} ==> ={M1.y}].
proof.
proc.
wp.
rnd (fun z => M1.x{1} ^^ M1.x{2} ^^ z).
skip; progress.
smt(xorA xorC xorK xor_ff).
smt(dmybool1E).
smt(dmybool_fu).
by apply H.
smt(xorA xorC xorK xor_ff).
qed.
```

For our second probabilistic noninterference example, consider the program

```
module M2 = \{
  var x : mybool (* private *)
  var y : mybool (* public *)
  proc f() : unit = {
    var b : mybool;
    if (x = tt) {
      b <$ dmybool;</pre>
      if (b = tt) {
        y <- y ^^ tt;
     }
    }
    else {
      b \leq -ff;
 y <- y ^^ b;
}
}.
```

Because the procedure M2.f is branching on the value of the private variable M2.x, we will have to use the one-sided if tactics. In fact, we can begin our proof by running

```
proc; wp; if{1}; if{2}.
```

which gives us four subgoals, corresponding to the four combinations of whether the conditional's boolean expression holds or does not hold in the two memories.

The first subgoal is

```
Type variables: <none>
&1 (left ) : {b : mybool} [programs are in sync]
&2 (right) : {b : mybool}
pre = (={M2.y} /\ M2.x{1} = Top.tt) /\ M2.x{2} = Top.tt
(1--) b <$ dmybool
(2--) if (b = Top.tt) {
(2.1) M2.y <-
( ) M2.y ^^ Top.tt
(2--) }
post = M2.y{1} \cap b{1} = M2.y{2} \cap b{2}
```

We can solve this goal by running auto, which correctly guesses that rnd should be applied using the identity isomorphism.

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But it's instructive to see how we could prove it by first running

```
seq 1 1 : (={M2.y, b}).
```

giving us two sub-subgoals, the first of which is

Type variables: <none>

&1 (left) : {b : mybool} [programs are in sync] &2 (right) : {b : mybool} pre = (={M2.y} /\ M2.x{1} = Top.tt) /\ M2.x{2} = Top.tt (1) b <\$ dmybool post = ={M2.y, b}

We can solve this goal with

rnd; auto.

This leaves us with

Type variables: <none> &1 (left) : {b : mybool} [programs are in sync] &2 (right) : {b : mybool} pre = ={M2.y, b} (1--) if (b = Top.tt) { (1.1) M2.y <-() M2.y ^ Top.tt (1--) } $post = M2.y{1} \cap b{1} = M2.y{2} \cap b{2}$

which auto will solve.

The second subgoal is

Type variables: <none> &1 (left) : {b : mybool} &2 (right) : {b : mybool} pre = (={M2.y} /\ M2.x{1} = Top.tt) /\ M2.x{2} <> Top.tt b <\$ (1--) b <- ff (-) dmybool if (b =(2--)(-) Top.tt) { (2.1)M2.y <-M2.y ^^ () () Top.tt } (2--)

post = M2.y{1} ^^ b{1} = M2.y{2} ^^ b{2}

Again, it's instructive to start with using seq, this time to pick off just the random assignment in the left program:

```
seq 1 0 : (={M2.y}).
```

giving us two sub-subgoals, the first of which is

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Here, only the first program *ends* with a random assignment, and so we can't run rnd. We can however run the one-sided version

 $rnd{1}.$

which gives us

Type variables: <none>

```
&1 (left ) : {b : mybool} [programs are in sync]
&2 (right) : {b : mybool}
pre = (={M2.y} /\ M2.x{1} = Top.tt) /\ M2.x{2} <> Top.tt
post =
    is_lossless dmybool &&
    forall (b0 : mybool), b0 \in dmybool => ={M2.y}
```

The postcondition of this goal makes us prove that the distribution we are choosing from in the left program is lossless (is a distribution, not just a sub-distribution).

The postcondition also makes us prove that for all values b0 in the support of the distribution, the original postcondition holds, where b0 would have been substituted for any occurrences of $b{1}$ (there are none, though). We can solve this goal with

skip; smt(dmybool_ll).

This leaves us with the sub-subgoal

```
Type variables: <none>
```

```
&1 (left ) : {b : mybool}
&2 (right) : {b : mybool}
pre = = \{M2.y\}
if (b =
                             (1--) b <- ff
                             ( -)
   Top.tt) {
  M2.y <-
                             (1.1)
    M2.v ^^
    Top.tt
}
                             (1 - -)
post = M2.y{1} \cap b{1} = M2.y{2} \cap b{2}
```

which can be solved using techniques we've already studied, using not_tt.

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The third subgoal is symmetric to the second one

Type variables: <none>

&1 (left) : {b : mybool} &2 (right) : {b : mybool} pre = (={M2.y} /\ M2.x{1} <> Top.tt) /\ M2.x{2} = Top.tt b <- ff(1--) b <\$ (-) dmybool (2--) if (b =(-) Top.tt) { (2.1) M2.y⁻(-) M2.y⁻() Top.tt (2--) }

post = M2.y{1} ^^ b{1} = M2.y{2} ^^ b{2}

And the fourth and final subgoal is

which can be solved by

auto.

Putting it all together, and simplifying a bit, the complete probabilistic noninterference proof for our second example is:

```
lemma lem2' :
  equiv[M2.f ~ M2.f : ={M2.y} ==> ={M2.y}].
proof.
proc; if{1}; if{2}; wp.
(* first case *)
auto.
(* second case *)
auto; progress.
smt(dmybool_ll).
smt(xorA xorK).
rewrite not_tt in H2; smt().
(* third case *)
auto; progress.
smt(dmybool_ll).
smt(xorA xorK).
rewrite not_tt in H2; smt().
(* fourth case *)
auto.
qed.
```